Early in his career, the notation of his writings on logic was often idiosyncratic. His later writings nearly always employed the now-dated notation of Principia mathematica. Set against all this are the simplicity of his preferred method (as exposited in his Methods of Logic ) for determining the satisfiability of quantified formulas, the richness of his philosophical and linguistic insights, and the fine prose in which he expressed them. Most of quine's original work in formal logic from 1960 onwards was on variants of his predicate functor logic, one of several ways that have been proposed for doing logic without quantifiers. For a comprehensive treatment of predicate functor logic and its history, see quine (1976). For an introduction, see chpt. 45 of his Methods of Logic.
Willard Van Orman quine essay collection details: Philosophy
Quine wrote this book in 6 weeks as an ad hoc solution to his teaching needs. The four editions of this book resulted from a more advanced undergraduate course in logic remote quine taught from the end of World War ii until his 1978 retirement. A concise and witty undergraduate treatment of a number of quinian themes, such as the prevalence of use-mention confusions, the dubiousness of quantified modal logic, and the non-logical character of higher-order logic. Mathematical Logic is based on quine's graduate teaching during the 1930s and '40s. It shows that much of what Principia mathematica took more than 1000 pages to say can be said in 250 pages. The proofs are concise, even cryptic. The last chapter, on Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Tarski's indefinability theorem, along with the article quine (1946 became a launching point for raymond Smullyan 's later lucid exposition of these and related results. Quine's work in logic gradually became dated in some respects. Techniques he did not teach and discuss include analytic tableaux, recursive functions, and model theory. His treatment of metalogic left something to be desired. For example, mathematical Logic does not include any proofs of soundness and completeness.
Lejewski then goes on to offer a description of free logic, which he claims accommodates an answer to the problem. Lejewski also points out that free logic additionally can handle the problem shredder of the empty set for statements like xFxxFxdisplaystyle forall x,Fxrightarrow exists x,. Quine had considered the problem of the empty set unrealistic, which left Lejewski unsatisfied. 22 Logic edit over the course of his career, quine published numerous technical and expository papers on formal logic, some of which are reprinted in his Selected Logic Papers and in The ways of Paradox. Quine confined logic to classical bivalent first-order logic, hence to truth and falsity under any (nonempty) universe of discourse. Hence the following were not logic for quine: quine wrote three undergraduate texts on formal logic: Elementary logic. While teaching an introductory course in 1940, quine discovered that extant texts for philosophy students did not do justice to quantification theory or first-order predicate logic.
Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing. Quine resists the temptation to year say that non-referring terms are meaningless for reasons made clear above. Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. However, czesław Lejewski criticizes this belief for reducing the matter to empirical discovery when it seems we should have a formal distinction between referring and non-referring terms or elements of our domain. Lejewski writes further, This state of affairs does not seem to be very satisfactory. The idea that some of our rules of inference should depend on empirical information, which may not be forthcoming, is so foreign to the character of logical inquiry that a thorough re-examination of the two inferences existential generalization and universal instantiation may prove worth our.
Thus, while it is possible to verify or falsify whole theories, it is not possible to verify or falsify individual statements. Almost any particular statement can be saved, given sufficiently radical modifications of the containing theory. For quine, scientific thought forms a coherent web in which any part could be altered in the light of empirical evidence, and in which no empirical evidence could force the revision of a given part. Quine's writings have led to the wide acceptance of instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. Existence and its contrary edit The problem of non-referring names is an old puzzle in philosophy, which quine captured when he wrote, a curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three anglo-saxon monosyllables: 'What is there?' It can be answered, moreover, in a word—'everything'—and everyone will accept this answer as true. 21 More directly, the controversy goes, how can we talk about Pegasus? To what does the word 'pegasus' refer? If our answer is, 'something then we seem to believe in mystical entities; if our answer is, 'nothing then we seem to talk about nothing and what sense can be made of this?
Ontological Relativity other Essays ( wv quine
Citation needed quine finds the notion of such a space problematic, arguing that there is no distinction between those truths which are universally and confidently believed and those which are necessarily true. Confirmation holism and ontological relativity edit The central theses underlying the indeterminacy of translation and other extensions of quine's work are ontological relativity and the related doctrine of confirmation holism. The premise of confirmation holism is that all theories (and the propositions derived from them) are under-determined by empirical data (data, sensory-data, evidence although some theories are not justifiable, failing to fit with the data or being unworkably complex, there are many equally justifiable alternatives. While the Greeks' assumption that (unobservable) Homeric gods exist is false, and our supposition of (unobservable) electromagnetic waves is true, both are to be justified solely by their ability to explain our observations. Quine concluded his " Two dogmas of Empiricism " as follows: As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.religion
For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits. Quine's ontological relativism (evident in the passage above) led him to agree with pierre duhem that for any collection of empirical evidence, there would always be many theories able to account for. However, duhem's holism is much more restricted and limited than quine's. For Duhem, underdetermination applies only to physics or possibly to natural science, while for quine it applies to all of human knowledge.
Although quine is not normally associated with verificationism, some philosophers believe the tenet is not incompatible with his general philosophy of language, citing his Harvard colleague. Skinner and his analysis of language in Verbal Behavior. 20 like other Analytic philosophers before him, quine accepted the definition of "analytic" as "true in virtue of meaning alone". Unlike them, however, he concluded that ultimately the definition was circular. In other words, quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory. This criticism of Kant's epistemology was similar to that of the 18th century writer Johann Gottfried Herder, as both individuals found fault in the kantian system for not sufficiently accounting for the dependence of reasoning on language.
Quine's chief objection to analyticity is with the notion of synonymy (sameness of meaning a sentence being analytic, just in case it substitutes a synonym for one "black" in a proposition like "All black things are black" (or any other logical truth ). The objection to synonymy hinges upon the problem of collateral information. We intuitively feel that there is a distinction between "All unmarried men are bachelors" and "There have been black dogs but a competent English speaker will assent to both sentences under all conditions since such speakers also have access to collateral information bearing on the. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths. Another approach to quine's objection to analyticity and synonymy emerges from the modal notion of logical possibility. A traditional Wittgensteinian view of meaning held that each meaningful sentence was associated with a region in the space of possible worlds.
Quine, willard Van Orman: Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Internet
Thesis and early publications were on formal logic and set theory. Only after World War ii did he, by virtue of seminal papers on ontology, epistemology and language, emerge as a major philosopher. By the 1960s, he had worked out his "naturalized epistemology" whose aim was to answer all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning using the methods and tools of the natural sciences. Quine roundly rejected the notion that there summary should be a "first philosophy a theoretical standpoint somehow prior to natural science and capable of justifying. These views are intrinsic to his naturalism. Quine could lecture in French, Spanish, portuguese and German, as well as his native english. Like the logical positivists, quine evinced little interest in the philosophical canon: only once did he teach a course in the history of philosophy, on Hume. Clarification needed rejection of the analyticsynthetic distinction edit see also: Two dogmas of Empiricism In the 1930s and '40s, discussions with Rudolf Carnap, nelson goodman and Alfred Tarski, among others, led quine to doubt the tenability of the distinction between "analytic" statements—those true simply.
For the academic year 19641965, quine was a fellow on the faculty in the center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. 13 In 1980 quine received an honorary doctorate from the faculty of Humanities at Uppsala University, sweden. 14 quine was an atheist when he was a teenager. 15 he had four children by two marriages. 2 guitarist Robert quine was his nephew. Political beliefs edit quine was politically conservative, but the bulk of his writing was in technical areas of philosophy removed from direct political issues. 16 he did, however, write in defense of several conservative positions: for example, in quiddities: An restaurant Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, he wrote a defense of moral censorship ; 17 while, in his autobiography, he made some criticisms of American postwar academic culture. 18 19 quine's.
Europe thanks to a sheldon fellowship, meeting Polish logicians (including Stanislaw Lesniewski and Alfred Tarski ) and members of the vienna circle (including Rudolf Carnap as well as the logical positivist. 2 It was through quine's good offices that Tarski was invited to attend the september 1939 Unity of Science congress in Cambridge. To attend that Congress, tarski sailed for the us on the last ship to leave danzig before the Third reich invaded Poland. Tarski survived the war and worked another 44 years in the. During World War ii, quine lectured on logic in Brazil, in Portuguese, and served in the United States navy in a military intelligence role, deciphering messages from German submarines, and reaching the rank of lieutenant commander. 2 At Harvard, quine helped supervise the harvard graduate theses of, among others, david Lewis, daniel Dennett, gilbert Harman, dagfinn Føllesdal, hao wang, hugues leblanc, henry hiz and george myro.
Two dogmas of Empiricism " (1951 which attacked the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and advocated a form of semantic holism, and, word and Object (1960 which further developed these positions and introduced quine's famous indeterminacy of translation thesis, advocating a behaviorist theory. He also developed an influential naturalized epistemology that tried to provide "an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories on the basis of meager sensory input." 8 he is also important in real philosophy of science for his "systematic attempt to understand. This led to his famous quip that "philosophy of science is philosophy enough." 9 In philosophy of mathematics, he and his Harvard colleague hilary putnam developed the " quinePutnam indispensability thesis an argument for the reality of mathematical entities. 10 Contents biography edit According to his autobiography, the time of my life (1986 quine grew up in Akron, Ohio, where he lived with his parents and older brother Robert Cloyd. His father, Cloyd Robert, 11 was a manufacturing entrepreneur (founder of the akron Equipment Company, which produced tire molds) 12 and his mother, harriett. (also known as "Hattie" according to the 1920 census was a schoolteacher and later a housewife. 2 he received his. In mathematics from Oberlin College in 1930, and his.
Willard Van Orman quine - wikipedia
Willard Van Orman quine ( /kwaɪn/ ; known to intimates as "Van 2, june 25, 1908 december 25, 2000) was. American philosopher and logician in with the analytic tradition, recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century." 3, from 1930 until his death 70 years later, quine was continually affiliated with. Harvard University in one way or another, first as a student, then as a professor of philosophy and a teacher of logic and set theory, and finally as a professor emeritus who published or revised several books in retirement. He filled the Edgar pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard from 1956 to 1978. A 2009 poll conducted among analytic philosophers named quine as the fifth most important philosopher of the past two centuries. 4 5, he won the first, schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy in 1993 for "his systematical and penetrating discussions of how learning of language and communication are based on socially available evidence and of the consequences of this for theories on knowledge and linguistic. Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy for his "outstanding contributions to the progress of philosophy in the 20th century by proposing numerous theories based on keen insights in logic, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of language." 7, quine falls squarely into the analytic philosophy. His major writings include ".