18 Drained by the fierce pursuit, mohammed fell ill and died at a fishing village on an island in the caspian sea in early 1221, an ignominious end for the man who styled himself the 'second Alexander'. Great cavalry raid (1220-1223) edit subutai and Jebe spent part of the 1219 winter in azerbaijan and Iran, raiding and looting while preventing the western Khwarezm forces from assisting the rest of the empire to the east. Here he conceived the idea of conducting the most audacious reconnaissance-in-force in history, which was described by Edward Gibbon as an expedition "which has never been attempted, and has never been repeated. 20,000 Mongol forces would circle the caspian sea through the caucasus mountains to fall on the rear of the wild Kipchaks and Cumans. 19 Subutai apparently rode 1200 miles in a week, even sleeping in the saddle while his horses rode. 20 After destroying resistance in Persia and submitting azerbaijan, the mongols invaded the Christian Kingdom of georgia.
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Despite being outnumbered 3:1 against the book sultan's elite forces which had conquered much of Central Asia, subutai held him off after a fierce battle and retreated during the night. According to persian sources, this battle seems to have eroded Mohammed's confidence in his ability to defeat the mongols in pitched battle, since subutai only commanded a small 20,000 man force and did not want to even fight him. Supposedly the mongol army had destroyed his left wing, and nearly broken his center and captured him, until reinforcements from his son arrived and the battlefield turned dark. 16 Because of this battle, mohammed was unable to take advantage of the upheaval in the Khara-Khitai empire (simultaneously being conquered by the mongolian general Jebe like he had in earlier wars. Genghis Khan led the mongol army westwards in late 1219 to invade Khwarizm as retaliation for the execution of Mongol ambassadors. With roughly 100,000 armed men, the mongol army was numerically inferior to the forces of the Khwarizim Empire, but through deception and rapid maneuver, the mongols defeated the isolated Khwarezm armies in detail before they could react. Serving as the mongol equivalent of Genghis Khan's Chief of Staff, subutai marched with the Khan's army through the deadly kyzylkum Desert to emerge behind the Khwarezm defense network at bukhara. 17 After the rapid capture of the Khwarezm center of defense, samarkand, genghis Khan dispatched Subutai and Jebe with 30,000 men to hunt the Khwarezm Shah and prevent him from rallying the other Khwarezm armies. Shah Mohammad attempted to save himself by fleeing into central Persia, but while he eluded capture, the relentless chase meant he could not rally his forces. As a result, the several hundred thousand man Khwarezm forces in reserve remained divided and were easily destroyed piecemeal by genghis Khan's main army.
In Khwarezm, the yardage mongols created a rift between the forces loyal to the Shah's mother and the Shah's own armies, all while harrying the Shah to prevent him from fixing the situation and rallying armies. In georgia, civilian massacres lured King george iv 's army into the open, while north of the caucasus, clever diplomacy sundered the alliance between the nomadic Cumans and the local Alans and Circassians. Central Asian Campaigns (1217-1220) edit in 1217, genghis Khan sent Subutai to hunt down the hated Merkits and their allies, the kipchak/Cuman confederacy, in modern-day central kazakhstan. Subutai defeated them on the Chu river in 1217 and again in 1219 in Wild Kipchak territory. Before the battle of the Chem river in 1219, subutai had his vanguard carry children's toys and leave them behind, as if they were a group of families fleeing from the merkit. As a result of this deception, subutai's army was able to surprise, encircle, and capture of all the merkit/Kipchak leadership. 15 Mohammad ii of Khwarizm attacked Subutai shortly afterwards along the Irghiz river.
Subutai kept his forces in line with the mongol tradition of dispensing with excess baggage train and ensured his troops could efficiently live off the land and rapidly advance great distances on campaign. He preferred to maneuver the enemy into a position of weakness before committing to battle. Subutai was very vigilant about conserving Mongol lives, and would devise golf elaborate strategic maneuvers or conduct frequent massacres to terrorize populations into submission so as to limit future casualties. Like genghis Khan, subutai was a master at creating divisions within the enemy ranks and surprising them. The terrifying Mongol reputation, combined with highly effective spy networks that spread discord, as well as incentives to key local leaders, prevented his opponents from effectively uniting and fighting at their full capacity. Oftentimes enemy resistance simply collapsed when the mongols drew near, or they were simply paralyzed and didn't take action in time. When attacking the merkits, subutai repeatedly deceived them into thinking his armies were far away, only to surprise and surround them.
At the battle of the kalka and the battle of liegnitz, the mongol armies drew portions of their foes armies away from their comrades, and used smoke to obscure the enemy vision and prevent them from seeing their isolated units encircled and destroyed. Subutai was also well known for incorporating conquered peoples who brought specialized skills into his forces, especially engineers. He was skilled at intelligence gathering and planning his campaigns well in advance. For instance, he used spies to gather detailed information on the russian principalities, the poles, and the hungarians at least a year before the attacks on each. His European adversaries were stunned by the intricacy of the mongol espionage networks. 14 he tailored his strategy to match the enemy, adjusting his tactics according to the opponents, the terrain, and the weather as required. He emphasized the use of light cavalry in his army, maneuvering the enemy into feints and ambushes, and efficiently pursuing and defeating broken armies to destroy further resistance.
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The vanguard of the russian army was already put in flight before the second wave even reached the battlefield and began to deploy. 12 Subutai was one of the first Mongol generals, alongside genghis Khan, who realized the value of engineers in siege warfare. Even in field battles he made use of siege engines. In the battle of Mohi, the hungarian crossbowmen repelled a night bridge pourquoi crossing by the mongols, and inflicted considerable casualties on the mongols fighting to cross the river the following day. Subutai ordered huge stonethrowers to clear the bank of Hungarian crossbowmen and open the way for his light cavalry to cross the river without further losses.
This use of siege weapons was one the first recorded use of artillery bombardments against the enemy army to disrupt their resistance while simultaneously attacking them. In execution, his usage functioned more akin to the creeping barrage of World War i, used to soften and disrupt enemy lines right before an attack. 13 While the stonethrowers were clearing the path to cross the main bridge, subutai supervised construction of another temporary bridge downriver to outflank the hungarians. The hungarians, focused on the attack at the bridge and knowing that the sajo river was too deep to ford, did not expect the mongols to be able to create a pontoon bridge, especially at night. Subutai's engineering ingenuity extended to the totally unique use of smokescreens to shroud key areas of the battlefield.
He also served as a commander of the vanguard with distinction in the 1204 battle against the naiman that gave the mongols total control over Mongolia. As a general edit subutai was a major innovator in the art of war, and his later campaigns demonstrated an unprecedented level of complexity and strategy not seen again until World War. In the invasions of China, russia, and Europe, subutai routinely coordinated armies of 100,000 men across frontages separated by 500-1,000 km and between 3 and 5 separate army groups. These maneuvers were highly synchronized despite the enormous distances: the mongols defeated the main army of Poland and Hungary in separate battles two days apart. Though impressive on a geometric level, subutai's maneuvers were designed to present his foes with a false illusion and strike them from the least expected angle. The mongol invasion of the jin in 1232 continually pulled the hitherto successful Jin forces apart despite their highly advantageous terrain, as they could not determine which Mongol armies were the feints and which were the true threats until their main army became isolated and.
Strongly fortified locations would be bypassed and ignored until all organized resistance had been destroyed. Sieges would be limited to critical or vulnerable locations; in other situations, the mongols either left a blockading force, or simply ignored fortified citadels and devastated the surrounded agriculture so that the remaining people would starve if they remained within fortified walls. 11 due to his long tenure of service, subutai had the opportunity to face off against elite armies of all types from west to east, and emerged triumphant in every campaign. The horse archers of other great steppe confederacies, the elite jurchen cavalry of China in the 1230s, the seasoned Qangli turk cavalry of the Khwarezm, fresh from conquering their own Empire, and the heavily armored knights of georgia, poland, and Hungary were all powerless against. In contrast to the common perception of steppe horse archer armies slowly attritioning away at their foes with arrows for many hours or even days, such as at the battle of Carrhae or the battle of Manzikert, subutai fought in a much more decisive and. At the battle of the kalka river in 1223, subutai's 20,000 man army routed the 80,000 man Russian army by stringing it out after a 9-day retreat, and then immediately turning and delivering a decisive charge without a prolonged missile bombardment.
Samarkand, bukhara, and Khiva
9 Throughout most of Genghis Khan's lifetime, subutai would have the opportunity to apprentice on detached missions under the elite jebe (121112, 121314, 121923) and Muqali (121314 in addition to genghis Khan himself (1219). It is likely that his unique access to the most brilliant Mongol leaders assisted his growth. Subutai's first chance at independent command came in 1197, when he was just 22 years old. This boon occurred during the war against Genghis Khan's most hated enemy, the merkit. Subutai's role was to act as the vanguard and defeat one of the merkit camps at the Tchen river. Subutai refused Genghis Khan's offer for extra elite troops, assignment and instead traveled to the merkit camp alone, posing as a mongol deserter. Subutai managed to convince the merkits that the main Mongol army was far away, and they were in no danger. As a result, the merkit lowered their guard and limited their patrols, allowing the mongols to easily surprise and encircle the merkits, capturing two generals. 10 This is evidence that even in his formative years, subutai was a highly unorthodox general who found innovative ways to cheaply solve problems with few casualties.
During the invasion of Northern China in 1211, subutai was partnered with the senior Mongol general Jebe, an apprentice and partnership they would maintain until Jebe's death in 1223. In 1212 he took huan by storm, the first major independent exploit mentioned in the sources. Genghis Khan is reported to have called him one of his "dogs of war who were 4 of his 8 top lieutenants, in The secret History of the mongols : 7 "They are the four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords. In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are jebe, and Kublai (different essay than Kublai khan jelme, and Subotai." — The secret History of the mongols Subutai seems to have been identified from early on by temujin as special, and given rare opportunities for growth. Appointed to the prestigious post of Genghis Khan's ger (yurt) door guard during his teen years, mongol histories say that Subutai said to genghis Khan, "I will ward off your enemies as felt cloth protects one from the wind." 8 This access enabled him.
robbers, he was seized. Huluhun (Subutai's brother) and Subutai arrived in good time, and with their lances stabbed some of the robbers. Horses and men fell together, and the remainder of the band withdrew and departed. Consequently, they relieved their fathers difficulty, and the sheep were able to attain the emperors station. 5 Despite this close family association, subutai may be considered proof that the mongol Empire was a meritocracy. He was a commoner by birth, the son of Jarchigudai, who was supposedly a blacksmith. When he was 14 years old, subutai left his clan to join Temujin's army, following in the footsteps of his older brother Jelme who had joined when he was 17 years old, and he rose to the very highest command available to one who was. 6 Within a decade he rose to become a general, in command of one of 4 tumens operating in the vanguard.
As a result of his upbringing, subutai lacked the natural horsemanship training from birth that all Mongols possessed, making him an outsider among them. Subutai's family had been plan associated with the family of Temujin (future genghis Khan) for many generations. Subutai's great-great grandfather, nerbi, was supposedly an ally of the mongol Khan Tumbina sechen. Subutai's father, jarchigudai, supposedly supplied food to temujin and his followers when they were in dire straits at lake baljuna, and Subutai's elder brother. Jelme also served as a general in the mongol army and was a close companion of Temujin. Jelme rescued a severely wounded Temujin (hit by an arrow from. Jebe, then an enemy) in the process of unification of the mongolian plateau. Another brother, Chaurkhan (also romanized as ca'urqan) is mentioned in the. Secret History of the mongols.
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Genghis Khan and Ögedei khan. He directed more than twenty campaigns in which proposal he conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles, during which he conquered or overran more territory than any other commander in history. 1, he gained victory by means of imaginative and sophisticated strategies and routinely coordinated movements of armies that were hundreds of kilometers away from each other. He is also remembered for devising the campaign that destroyed the armies. Hungary and, poland within two days of each other, by forces over five hundred kilometers apart. By any metric, he is one of the most successful commanders in history. Contents, early life edit, historians believe subutai was born in the year 1175, 2 probably just west of the upper. Onon river in what is now, mongolia. He belonged to the, uriankhai clan, known as the reindeer people, a group of Siberian forest-dwellers who did not live like the plains Mongols to their south.